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The Reflex Machine and the Cybernetic Brain: 
The Critique of Abstraction and its Application to Computationalism 
 
Forthcoming in Perspectives on Science 
 
By M. Chirimuuta 
History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh 
 
Abstract 
Objections to the computational theory of cognition, inspired by 
20th century phenomenology, have tended to fixate on the embodiment 
and embeddedness of intelligence. In this paper I reconstruct a line of argument that 
focusses primarily on the abstract nature of scientific models, of which computational 
models of the brain are one sort. I observe that the critique of scientific abstraction was 
rather commonplace in the philosophy of the 1920’s and 30’s and that attention to it aids 
the reading of The Organism (1934/1939) by the neurologist Kurt Goldstein. With this 
background in place, we see that some brief but spirited criticisms of cybernetics by two 
later thinkers much influenced by Goldstein, Georges Canguilhem (1963) and Maurice 




1. Why the Brain is Not a Computer: Two Kinds of Argument 
 
The much publicised successes of artificial intelligence today – artificial neural networks 
that understand human speech, recognise faces, and defeat the best humans at the game 
Go – are generating speculation about the prospect of “solving intelligence”, the creation 
of a general, human level artificial intelligence. In the background of such forecasts is the 
assumption of computationalism. By this I mean the idea that the essence of cognition 
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(defined broadly to include perception, emotion, motor coordination) is computation. 
According to computationalism, cognition in a living animal can in principle be fully 
described, explained, and replicated by discovery of the computations employed in its 
tissues -- principally, in its brain and nervous system.  
 
In an earlier wave of hype around AI, a counter-movement of philosophical arguments 
against computationalism sprang up, giving us the memorable thought experiments of the 
“Chinese Room” and “Blockhead.”1 One current of anti-computationalist thought, 
associated in particular with the work of Hubert Dreyfus (1972), presented itself as speaking 
for the phenomenological tradition of early and mid 20th century philosophy. This current 
gave us the embodiment /embeddedness argument against computationalism. To put 
things very briefly, the idea is that there is an inarticulable background to intelligence, an 
embodied capacity to cope and act in the environment to which the creature is adapted (in 
which it is embedded), that is an essential precondition for intelligence, but which cannot 
be articulated and written into computer code. Since this background of coping skills cannot 
be programmed into artificial devices, but an agent cannot be truly intelligent without it, 
artificial intelligence (at least of the “symbolic” sort reliant on coded instructions) is 
impossible. This kind of anti-computationalist argument received much attention and 
helped start a movement of research within robotics, philosophy and cognitive science, 
often known as the 4E programme, standing for embodied, embedded, ecological and 
enactive cognition. 2 
 
In this paper I make the case that there is another line of argument against 
computationalism -- the abstraction argument3 -- that can be re-constructed from early-to-
                                                        
1 Searle (1980) and Block (1981). I will not be discussing these arguments further.  
2 Dreyfus (2008) presents some criticisms of this programme as carried out in robotics.  
3 In today’s philosophy of science, the treatment of abstraction (simplification, the omission of details) in 
scientific representation is often paired with idealisation (the employment of ‘distortions,’ ‘fictions’ or ideal 
mathematical structures that do not appear in nature). Since the omission of details is itself a kind of 
distortion, it can be hard to see the difference between abstraction and idealisation -- other than abstraction 
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mid 20th century philosophy, and which has been unduly neglected. The abstraction 
argument is a contribution to the philosophy of cognitive science, rather than a claim from 
within the philosophy of mind about the nature of cognition itself. The idea is just that 
scientific theories and models are always generated via abstraction from the greater 
complexity of concrete systems in nature. Thus, a computational model of the brain (or of 
just one of the brain’s functions) will be a very abbreviated abstraction and will leave out the 
details of the organismic processes which are actually responsible for sentience and flexible 
intelligence. For this reason, superficial appearances of equivalences of functions, between 
animals and computers, for narrowly specified behaviours, should not be taken as evidence 
that the computer model has captured something of the essence of organic intelligence, 
and that more elaborate versions of such models will scale up to replicating the total 
cognitive capacities of a living animal.  
 
Adherents to the 4E programme make the ontological claim that mind is embedded and 
embodied, but tend to neglect the examination of scientific methodology that is 
foundational to this claim about the nature of mind. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
this neglected philosophy of science. In broad strokes, my view of the relationship between 
these two kinds arguments against computationalism is as follows. Firstly, that there is a 
outlook in general philosophy of science, which I will dub the critique of abstraction in the 
next section. The critique of abstraction warns us against the reification of abstractions 
posited by scientists, because although instrumentally and predictively effective, the 
abstract concepts, and models that employ them, do not reveal the true nature of the 
objects and systems so depicted. This general stance then has applications in the 
examination of different branches of science. In philosophy of physics we encounter 
                                                        
being a species of the more general kind, idealisation. But note that the antonym of ‘abstract’ is ‘concrete,’ 
whereas the antonym of ‘ideal’ is ‘real.’ Early 20th century accounts of abstraction and idealisation tended to 
observe a difference between these two scientific practices, by keeping these antonyms in mind: to abstract is 
to depart from the concrete in a scientific representation, selecting only a few details to feature in the 
representation; but to idealise is to refer a pattern or tendency present in the real system to a more perfect, 
ideal version of it that exists only in the scientific representation.  
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Bergson’s rejection of the spatialisation of time (Section 2.1) and Whitehead’s warning 
against the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (Section 2.2).  It is certainly there in the 
philosophical background of Gestalt psychology (Harrington 1996, chapter 4).4  
 
The critique of abstraction, applied to the science of living systems, is the starting point for 
Kurt Goldstein’s organicist philosophy of biology (Section 3). In fact, the history of the 
abstraction argument against computationalism is bound up with the early 20th century 
movement in biology known as organicism.5 Organismic biology is typically contrasted with 
the mechanistic or reductive approach to living systems, where it is claimed that the 
reductive, part-to-whole direction of explanation is not adequate in biology, because in living 
organisms, unlike machines, there is an influence going from the direction of the whole to 
its constituent parts. For this reason, organismic biology is often referred to as holistic, and 
we find the terms “organism” and “holism” appearing in close sequence, as in the English 
title of the magnum opus of the neurologist Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965): The Organism: A 
holistic approach to biology derived from pathological data in man.6 However, claims that 
the state of the whole organism influences the behaviour of its constituent parts, that 
organisation matters more in biology than in the physical sciences,7 and that there are 
emergent properties, are often taken to be philosophically opaque or problematic because 
                                                        
4 Length limitations do not permit me to delve into the critique of abstraction as it played out in Gestalt 
psychology, though obviously this was an important influence on two of the thinkers under discussion here – 
Goldstein and Merleau-Ponty. It is important keep in mind that they were not uncritical adherents to Gestalt 
ideas (Goldstein 1934/1939, chapter 8, Muller 2018)  .  
5 See Peterson (2016, 6-7) who quotes Ritter’s definition of organicism as resting on, “the belief that a whole 
organism is ‘as essential to an explanation of its elements as its elements are to an explanation of the 
organism’” (emphasis original); also Dupré and Nicholson (2018). 
6 The original title is: Der Aufbau des Organismus: Einführung in die Biologie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Erfahrungen am kranken Menschen. See Harrington (1996, chapter 5) for an overview of Goldstein’s life 
and work; also Ferrario and Corsi (2013). 
7 E.g. Goldstein (1934/1939, 421-2 ): “This ‘essence of nature’ cannot be dissected mechanistically into parts, 
but it is a structurally articulated organization. True, we can dismember it, so that we construe ‘parts’; but this 
is only the case when we actually take it apart, i.e. split it up into its physico-chemical elements.” 
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even though organicists eschew metaphysical vitalism (i.e. commitment to special vital 
forces or substances), the ontological status of the “whole”, “organisation” and “emergence” 
is left under-theorised (Wolfe 2014). Below, I aim to show how the examination of the 
abstraction argument helps ground a more charitable interpretation of organicism, by 
helping to differentiate it from metaphysical vitalism.  
 
My claim is that the critique of abstraction employed in the philosophy of cognitive science 
leads inevitably to an anti-computationalist stance, in which computational models are at 
best predictively useful devices, and at worst generate the mistaken idea that cognition 
essentially is computation. With this view in place, a natural corollary in the philosophy of 
mind is the thesis that the cognition is a process that is essentially embodied and embedded 
– as upheld by the 4E movement. Examining historical precursors of the 4E movement – 
Merleau-Ponty, and Goldstein before him, we see that the critique of abstraction is 
foundational to the view that mind is embodied and embedded. That is, we see that the 
claims for embodiment and embeddedness are more compelling when resting on the 
foundation of the general philosophy of science that is the critique of abstraction. My 
account will come with some criticism of the way that Merleau-Ponty has been read in the 
4E tradition. Similar to Matherne (2014), I suggest that the level of attention paid to 
embodiment in Merleau-Ponty has occluded recognition of other dimensions of his thought. 
My account recommends a decentring of the Phenomenology of Perception, or at least an 
effort to pay more attention to works in which the detailed and critical examination of 
scientific methodology -- modelling and experimental practice -- is more prominent. It also 
pays to compare Merleau-Ponty’s views on abstraction in science to those of a 
contemporary not (to my knowledge) cited in the 4E literature – the historian and 
philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem. Both read Goldstein closely, and 
acknowledge their debt to his criticisms of mechanistic reflex physiology.  
 
The paper is arranged in an approximately chronological fashion. In the next section I offer 
a portrait of the discussion of abstraction in philosophy of science before WWII, with 
reference in particular to Bergson (1859-1941), Whitehead (1861-1947) and Husserl 
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(1859-1938). After my reading of Goldstein, which shows how his organicist thought is 
informed by the critique of abstraction, I demonstrate the continuity between Goldstein’s 
approach to biological knowledge, and the discussions of the machine-organism 
relationship in Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) (Section 4) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1908-1961) (Section 5). This last philosopher is now strongly associated with the 
embodiment/embeddedness argument against computationalism. But I will argue that in 
some key remarks on cybernetics, an early movement in artificial intelligence, the 
abstraction argument against computationalism plays a primary role. The rejection of the 
possibility of AI is often taken as a “biochauvinism” and anthropocentrism, which grants 
special status to cognition in living creatures, especially humans, for no sound reason.  The 
focus on abstraction offers a way to interpret the “biochauvinism” of Goldstein and 
Canguilhem (Wolfe 2015) not as in fact a chauvinism (an un-principled assertion of a 
difference), but a stance based on a defensible philosophy of scientific experimentation and 
modelling. The final Section 6 concludes with some proposals for future lines of 
investigation.  
 
2. The Critique of Abstraction, 1907-1938 
The common impression of the development of philosophy of science in the early decades 
of the twentieth century is a victor’s history: the tradition was founded by the “logical 
positivists” or “logical empiricists” such as Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath of the Vienna 
Circle; exile in the late 1930’s brought this tradition of analysis to the USA, where common-
sense anglophone realism provided a necessary correction to the Viennese empiricism, and 
Thomas Kuhn’s efforts grounded philosophy of science in real world cases from the history 
of science. What this story neglects is the important work within other traditions vying for 
the label “scientific philosophy”, phenomenology and the neo-Kantianism of the German-
speaking world before WWII (Neuber 2016). Also ignored is the work in philosophy of 
science of Bergson and Whitehead, two metaphysicians with a strong process orientation. 
The neglected tradition is anti-positivistic in that it denies that experience offers us neutral 
facts or observations that provide a foundation for the edifice of scientific knowledge. 
Attention to the way that the cognitive and material activities of scientists actively shape 
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the epistemic products of science is not compatible with a crude empiricism or positivism8 
that takes scientific knowledge to be made out of materials passively received from 
empirical observation, and not ones partially informed by human conditioning. That science 
relies on idealization and abstraction is an important indication of human-conditioning, the 
not purely factual nature of scientific knowledge. Thus it is not surprising that discussions 
of abstraction and idealization are common in the neglected tradition.9 
 
The sociologist and phenomenologist Alfred Schutz, writing in 1953, makes a retrospective 
observation of a consensus opinion – regarding the abstract nature of scientific knowledge 
–  amongst a range of thinkers: 
Most prominent thinkers of our time, and among them philosophers as different as 
James, Dewey,10 Bergson, Whitehead, and Husserl, have taught us that all our 
knowledge of the world in common sense as well as in scientific thinking involves 
constructs, namely, a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, and 
idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, 
there are no such things as mere facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset 
facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are therefore 
always interpreted facts, namely, either facts looked at as detached from their context 
                                                        
8 I say “crude” because there are ways for empiricists account for abstraction in science. This is prominent in 
Ernst Mach’s writing (e.g. Mach 1895). 
9 One should note that attention to the active and constructive nature of scientific knowledge is consistent 
with a Kantian epistemology. It is not coincidental that important early 20th century treatments of idealization 
in science came from philosophers belonging to a Kantian tradition: Cassirer (1910/1923), Vaihinger 
(1911/1924). One should also note that the organicist critique of abstraction is prefigured in 19th century 
German Idealism, especially the work of Schelling and Hegel, (e.g. Hegel 1807/2018, §§281-2); and before then 
in the organicist materialism of Margaret Cavendish (Peterman 2019). It is also feasible to connect George 
Berkeley’s rejection, in the New Theory of Vision, of a proto-version of computationalism – Descartes’ 
geometric theory of distance perception – to the critique of abstraction that pervades Berkeley’s philosophy.  
10 For the purposes of this paper I will say little about the place of American pragmatism in the critique of 
abstraction, focussing instead on the philosophers who had a more obvious influence on the thought of 
Merleau-Ponty and Canguilhem. The connections between James and Bergson are prominent (e.g. James 
1909/1936). 
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by an artificial abstraction or as facts considered in their particular setting. In either case, 
they carry along their interpretational inner and outer horizons. This does not mean that 
in daily life or in science we are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just means 
that we grasp merely certain aspects of it, namely, those which are either relevant to us 
either for carrying on our business of living or relevant from the point of view of a body 
of accepted rules of procedure of thinking called the method of science. (Embree 1997, 
135) 
The context of Schutz’s paper is telling. It was a response to papers by Ernst Nagel and Carl 
Hempel11 that had been presented at an American Philosophical Association symposium  
on, “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences.” An exchange of letters 
between Schutz and the phenomenologist Aaron Gurwitsch indicates that there was at the 
time a struggle going on for the soul of philosophy of science in America, with positivists 
and phenomenologists each staking their claims (Embree 124).12 An indication of the 
decisive victory of the positivist side is that none of the philosophers on Schutz’s list went 
into the Philosophy of Science canon that was established in the 1960’s and after, which 
was pretty much restricted to logical empiricists, Kuhn, and the anglophone scientific 
realists who responded to them. Since abstraction and idealization, being indications of the 
conditioned nature of scientific facts, are a fly in the ointment of the empiricist philosophy 
of science attacked by Schutz, it is not coincidental that these topics only became 
prominent again in philosophy of science after the 1980’s, when empiricism had by then 
faded. A key work that put idealization back on the agenda for philosophers of science was 
How the Laws of Physics Lie by Nancy Cartwright (1983). These later discussions of 
abstraction and idealization do not, however, tend to refer to the early 20th century 
treatments, the memory of which had by then been consigned to oblivion.13 For readers 
                                                        
11 Two philosophers who had a major role in the establishment of the logical empiricist/positivist tradition of 
philosophy of science in the USA. 
12 See also the dedication of Herbert Spiegelberg (1960), which is to the memory of Alfred Schutz -- “one of the 
brightest hopes for an authentic phenomenology in the United States”. 
13 The exception is Duhem (1906/1954), whom Cartwright credits and who is often discussed in philosophy of 
science textbooks, though he tends to be assimilated to instrumentalism – a kind of empiricist anti-realism. 
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unfamiliar with these early views I provide in the remainder of this section a summary of 
some relevant points from Bergson, Whitehead, and Husserl on the topic of abstraction.  
 
2.1 Bergson on the Primal Abstractions of Modern Science 
A running theme of Bergson’s philosophy is that the progress of classical physics, and the 
mechanistic biology based on its principles, came at the expense of a genuine 
understanding of time, and the processes of nature that take place in time, because of a 
reliance on the expediency of treating time by analogy with space (see start Section 4). 
Thus, there is a basic simplifying assumption that founds classical physics and the rest of 
modern science, the spatialisation of time.  A central task of philosophy is to learn to 
apprehend (“intuit”) time as we meet it in experience, independently of this abstraction, 
which is to experience time as “duration” [durée]. In my exposition of Bergson I focus on 
L’Évolution Créatrice (Creative Evolution), which was a best seller in its time.  
 
Bergson’s account of abstraction in science is bound up with his assumption that the exact 
sciences are the expression of the human intellect’s innate tendencies, which are geared 
towards the achievement of practical goals rather than knowledge or understanding of 
nature per se.14 For this reason, we should not expect the results of science to “supply us 
with an explanation of life” because, “they have something else to do” (Bergson 1907/1944, 
25), namely, to enable successful activity in the world. Accurate prediction is a requirement 
for successful action but, according to Bergson, an intellect bent on prediction will ignore 
(abstract away from) the manifest differences between individual occurrences of a type of 
event because they are irrelevant to prediction and the efficiency of a mode of cognition 
bent on control of nature. Bergson compares the reality of duration with the abstract artifice 
of the world taken in the intellectual/scientific view, a nature that is predictable because it 
is presumed to involve absolute repetition: 
                                                        
14 Examination of the practical intent of human cognition, even when it would seem most theoretical, is a point 
of connection between Bergson and the American pragmatists. 
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Real duration is that duration which gnaws on things and leaves on them the mark 
of its tooth. If everything is in time, everything changes inwardly, and the same 
concrete reality never recurs. Repetition is therefore possible only in the abstract: 
what is repeated is some aspect that our senses, and especially our intellect, have 
singled out from reality, just because our action, upon which all the effort of our 
intellect is directed, can move only among repetitions. (Bergson 1907/1944, 52) 
Bergson’s disagreement with the mechanistic explanation of living systems is that life is 
essentially temporal,15 whereas the mechanistic framework is fundamentally atemporal in 
that the future of the system whose dynamics are to be predicted are entirely given in the 
initial conditions and equations of motion (p.43).  
 
Generally speaking, Bergson’s view of the intellect (and hence science) is that it always 
proceeds by radical simplification of a natural order that far outstrips human cognitive 
representations of it with its richness of detail and changeability. Scientific knowledge can 
be compared with the outcome of simplification via dimensionality reduction. As Bergson 
writes the intellect, “is only the projection, necessarily on a plane, of a reality that possesses 
both relief and depth” (1907/1944, 59), and the only way to set aside this narrow and 
distorted way of seeing the world is to abandon the intellect in favour of a mode of “intuition”, 
less precise but more in tune with the flow of nature. Unlike Whitehead, Bergson does not 
take there to be flexibility in the kinds of abstractions that science employs, since Bergson 
takes them to be fixed tendencies of the human intellect. Thus biology is condemned to 
give us a mechanistic, and hence distorted picture of living organisms, one which 
analogises them to man-made machines: 
Now I recognize that positive science can and should proceed as if organization [in 
living bodies] was like making a machine. Only so will it have any hold on organized 
bodies. For its object is not to show us the essence of things, but to furnish us with 
the best means of acting on them. Physics and chemistry are well advanced 
sciences, and living matter lends itself to our action only so far as we can treat it by 
                                                        
15 As some philosophers of biology would say now, it is essentially processual (Dupré and Nicholson 2018).  
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the processes of our physics and chemistry. Organization can therefore only be 
studied scientifically if the organized body has first been likened to a machine…. 
(Bergson 1907/1944, 103-4) 
The mistake, according to Bergson, would be to confuse the outputs of mechanistic biology 
for the absolute truth about living systems.  
 
2.2 The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness 
In the widely read Science and the Modern World, a collection of lectures delivered in 1925, 
Whitehead identifies the central task of philosophy as being the criticism of abstractions.16 
The key term of Whitehead’s critique is the fallacy of misplaced concreteness – which is 
the error of mistaking the abstractions of science for the concrete things in the world that 
they are abstractions from. When introducing the fallacy, Whitehead acknowledges his debt 
to Bergson’s writing on the spatialisation of time, but emphasises that he, unlike Bergson, 
does not think that scientific thought is stuck forever with this problematic abstraction, that 
it is, “necessary to the intellectual apprehension of nature” (Whitehead 1925/1938, 66). 
 
A central thesis of Science and the Modern World is that science since the 17th century 
(which Whitehead tends to characterise as “Cartesian”), has been conducted under the 
guiding abstraction of simple spatial location. This fosters a crude materialist ontology, 
mind-matter dualism, and the removal of any intrinsic value from nature, leading to a clash 
between the scientific worldview and the worldview suggested by ethical and aesthetic 
experience.17 Fortunately, Whitehead argues, this guiding abstraction has been shown no 
                                                        
16 “The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group of abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the 
nature of the case, you have abstracted from the remainder of things. In so far as the excluded things are 
important in your experience, your modes of thought are not fitted to deal with them. You cannot think 
without abstractions; accordingly, it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising your modes 
of abstraction. It is here that philosophy finds its niche as essential to the healthy progress of society. It is the 
critic of abstractions” (Whitehead 1925/1938, 74). 
17 E.g. “The two evils [of Cartesian heritage] are: one, the ignoration of the true relation of each organism to its 
environment; and the other, the habit of ignoring the intrinsic worth of the environment which must be 
allowed its weight in any consideration of final ends” (Whitehead 1925/1938, 227). 
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longer tenable by advances in physics (relativity theory and quantum mechanics) and 
physiology, which together suggest an alternative to materialism, which is organicism or 
organic mechanism (see p. 125-9) – a metaphysics which is both relational (not assuming 
the elementary components of the world to be inherently unrelated to one another) and 
processual (not taking there to be changeless elementary components of the world). 
 
As discussed by Dupré and Nicholson (2018) and Peterson (2016), Science and the 
Modern World was an inspirational text for the British group of organicist biologists that 
included E. S. Russell and J. S. Haldane. There is a reference to Whitehead’s book in the 
list of additional sources in the 1939 English translation of The Organism, but it is not clear 
if Goldstein himself read it. Goldstein’s cousin and important philosophical influence, Ernst 
Cassirer, was well acquainted with the ideas of Bergson and Whitehead, and his Philosophy 
of Symbolic Forms vol. 3 can be read as a response to them, offering a picture of scientific 
modernity that is rather more sanguine about the abstractions of mathematical physics 
(Chirimuuta forthcoming-a).  
 
2.3 Abstraction from the Lifeworld 
At least two authors of the mid-20th century, reflecting on the recent history of 
phenomenology, noted a striking convergence in the philosophies of science developed 
independently by Whitehead and Husserl, which turned on the role of abstraction, in 
inaugurating a problematic subject-object dualism. Herbert Spiegelberg (1960:78-79) 
writes: 
There is, in fact, a striking likeness in the diagnosis of this scientific crisis in the nearly 
simultaneous but independent work of Husserl and Whitehead, although there is no 
evidence for mutual or one-sided influence: Whitehead, in The Concept of Nature 
(1920) and again in Science and the Modern World (1926), found the source of both 
the grandeurs and miseries of modern science in the ‘bifurcation’ which it introduced 
                                                        
 
 
Chirimuuta forthcoming Reflex Machine 
 13 
between a merely objective and a merely mentalistic or private branch of nature. 
Similarly Husserl, in his last work on Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1936), blamed the contemporary crisis 
on the split between Galilean objectivism and Cartesian subjectivism. This does not 
mean that Whitehead and Husserl also agreed on the therapy. But there is enough 
in Whitehead’s appeal to a return to the realism of immediate ‘prehension’ as the 
matrix of all scientific abstractions to make a comparison with some of Husserl’s last 
and particularly fertile ideas appropriate. (Cf. Paci 1961, 1964) 
Indeed, the inaugural statement of Husserl’s phenomenology, that what is needed is a 
return to the “things themselves” can be interpreted as a call to depart from the abstractions 
of the scientific theories of experience and return to the concrete world of lived 
experience.18 Goldstein (1971) does list Husserl as one of his three main philosophical 
influences (alongside Kant and Cassirer). Here Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) is an 
important intermediary figure between Goldstein and Husserl, since he worked both with 
the neurologist and the philosopher, and later wrote about the correspondences between 
their ideas (Gurwitsch 1949). I will now examine the critique of abstraction in Husserl. 
 
While the contrast between scientific abstraction and lived experience is an enduring theme 
of Husserl’s work, we have appearing in his late writings, of the 1930’s, the key term of the 
Lifeworld  [Lebenswelt] as the domain of intersubjective experience and practice that both 
founds scientific activity and is at the same time concealed by the objectifying worldview 
that science fosters.19 That science simultaneously pre-supposes and denies or conceals 
the Lifeworld is an irrationality that is bringing modern science to the point of crisis, 
according to Husserl; and the task of philosophy is to reveal what is masked by objectifying 
                                                        
18 “To return to the things themselves is to return to this world prior to knowledge, this world of which 
knowledge always speaks, and this world with regard to which every scientific determination is abstract, 
signitive, and dependent, just like geography with regard to the landscape where we first learned what a 
forest, a meadow, or a river is” (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, lxxii).  
19 see Moran (2012, chap. 6) and essays in Hyder and Rheinberger (2009) for exposition of the concept of 
Lifeworld. 
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science, through an interrogation of the intellectual foundations of science. As he writes of 
the surrounding life-world: 
it is always presupposed as the ground, as the field of work upon which alone his 
questions, his methods of thought, make sense. Where is that huge piece of method 
subjected to critique and clarification [--that method] that leads from the intuitively 
given surrounding world to the idealization of mathematics and to the interpretation 
of these idealizations as objective being? (Husserl 1970, 295)20 
An important idea is that the Lifeworld is itself recalcitrant to the objectivising treatment of 
natural science, and therefore gets covered with a “garb of ideas” [Ideenkleid]. Yet, the 
Lifeworld is the experienceable world, whereas the objective (“true”) world presented by 
science is an abstraction that is actually not experienceable.  
 
Much of Husserl’s discussion centres on the mathematization of nature through the 
development of quantitative physics beginning with Galileo. A crucial point for Husserl is 
that the process of abstraction or “formalization” [Formalisierung], in which the items of the 
life world are substituted for geometrised versions, is self-concealing. This is how Dermot 
Moran (2012:69) explains Husserl’s view, noting the agreement with Heidegger on this 
point: 
                                                        
20 Also, “Mathenatical natural science is a wonderful technique for making inductions with an efficiency, a 
degree of probability, a precision, and a computability that were simply unimaginable in earlier times. As an 
accomplishment it is a triumph of the human spirit. As for the rationality of its methods and theories, however, 
it is a thoroughly relative one. It even presupposes a fundamental approach that is itself totally lacking in 
rationality. Since the intuitively given surrounding world, this merely subjective realm, is forgotten in scientific 
investigation, the working subject is himself forgotten; the scientist does not become a subject of 
investigation. (Accordingly, from this standpoint, the rationality of the exact sciences is of a piece with the 
rationality of the Egyptian pyramids.)” (Husserl 1970, 295) 
It is worth commenting on the remark in brackets at the end of this quotation.  A theme of Husserl’s 
essay is that a distinctively European ideal of rationality, that started in Ancient Greece (marking that culture 
out from civilisations of the Orient that also had advances in philosophy and mathematics), has been forgotten 
in modern science. Thus, the comparison of modern science with the Egyptian pyramids is quite loaded and 
derogatory in the context. See Moran (2011) on the Eurocentrism of Husserl’s Crisis texts. 
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Formalization … abstracts from the material properties of a given entity and focuses 
on the object in terms of pure, empty, categorical forms…. Logic and mathematics 
employ formalization. …. Husserl is one of the first to recognize that the ‘abstractive 
closure’ (Geschlossenheit…) of the natural sciences is based on an abstraction and 
formalization away from the concrete individual occurrences. For Husserl (as, 
indeed, also for Heidegger), modern scientific research involves a particular 
‘formalization’ of experience which should never be substituted for the fullness of 
that experience itself in its lived ‘concretion.’ 
 
What is significant for our larger purpose, the reconstruction of an argument against 
computationalism, is how the critique of abstraction naturally leads one to look back at that 
which has been abstracted away from in development of the exact sciences, namely, the 
environing world in which we are embedded and the flesh in which we are embodied. Thus 
the consideration of embeddedness and embodiedness of human knowing, and cognition 
more generally, is a natural sequel of the argument from abstraction; but as I will argue 
below, it is a mistake to take the phenomenological argument against computationalism to 




                                                        
21 In the lecture notes on Nature we can see precisely how Merleau-Ponty interprets Husserl as seeking to 
interrogate a mode of experience that is prior to the idealized view of things that comes with scientific 
thought, and how this is said to lead Husserl to an interest in our embodied perceptual experience: 
“consciousness, even reduced, keeps a corner to itself, a fundamental and originary zone on which 
the world of idealizations is constructed. Kant ignores ‘inferior degrees of constitution’ – that is, of 
infrastructures that precede acts of idealization and furnish a quasi-natural base to the development 
of the ego cogito – because what interests Kant at first is the constitution of those idealizations that 
are science and philosophy. Husserl wants to understand what is nonphilosophical, what is 
preliminary to science and philosophy: hence his interest in the preliminary work by which a 
preliminary thing is constituted, and which is of the order of the primordial: hence the description of 
the role of the body in perception.”  (Merleau-Ponty 1995/2003, 71) 
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2.4 The Critique of Abstraction and Organicism 
As exemplified by the work of Bergson, Whitehead and Husserl, there was a view prevalent 
in the interwar period that science provides a set of useful but potentially misleading 
abstractions.  This critique of abstraction forms part of the backdrop to organicist biology.22 
In Creative Evolution, there is an early demonstration of how the critique of abstraction 
synthesises with an anti-mechanistic and holistic philosophy of biology. In answer to the 
question of whether he is denying that the living body is made up of the same matter as 
everything else, Bergson gives the reply that,   
we do not question the fundamental identity of inert matter and organized matter. 
The only question is whether the natural systems which we call living beings must 
be assimilated to the artificial systems that science cuts out within inert matter, or 
whether they must not rather be compared to that natural system which is the whole 
of the universe. That life is a kind of mechanism I cordially agree. But is it the 
mechanism of parts artificially isolated within the whole of the universe, or is it the 
mechanism of the real whole? The real whole might well be, we conceive, an 
indivisible continuity. The systems we cut out within it would, properly speaking, not 
then be parts at all; they would be partial views of the whole. And, with these partial 
views put end to end, you will not make even a beginning of the reconstruction of 
the whole, any more than, by multiplying photographs of an object in a thousand 
different aspects, you will reproduce the object itself. So of life and of the physico-
chemical phenomena to which you endeavor to reduce it. (Bergson 1907/1944, 36) 
                                                        
22 One should also mention the “British Emergentists”, C. D. Broad and Samuel Alexander, as part of this 
philosophical context. For example, Broad (1925, 5) writes,  
 “The [scientist] tends to forget that he has violently abstracted one part or one aspect of Reality from 
the rest, and to imagine that the success which this abstraction has given him within a limited field 
justifies him in taking the principles which hold therein as the whole truth about the whole world.”  
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Though Bergson is often labelled as a vitalist because of his talk of the élan vital,23 we see 
from this passage that the position is more subtle than this, and in concord with organicism. 
Bergson does not deny that during experimental investigation the components of a living 
system can be analysed as physical and chemical processes. What he does query is 
whether the parts detached in experiment are the ‘proper parts’ of the system, which are 
modular or isolatable, as in a machine, or whether we lose something of what the parts are 
when they are detached from their context because they are, rather, merely “partial views” 
of the whole system. As we see, this is very similar to Goldstein’s complaint that “dissecting” 
methods of experimental biology (ones which analyse a system part by part) will not be 
sufficient to explain the operation of the whole organism.  
 
Enzo Paci (1961, 248-50) detects an organicism that is common to Whitehead and Husserl, 
stemming from their shared view of things in the world as fundamentally interconnected, in 
which relations have primacy over intrinsic properties. The critique of abstraction and the 
philosophy of relations together engender an organismic biology:  if one considers 
everything, a forteriori living organisms, to be fundamentally interconnected systems, any 
approach to knowing them grounded in the investigation of the parts of the systems in 
isolation, and then subsequent observation of the interaction of parts (as in the reverse 
engineering of a man-made mechanism), will be an impoverished abstraction, one blind to 
the ways that contextual factors, the states of the whole system, radically alter the character 
of the supposed parts. As we will see, the poverty of abstraction is an often sounded note 
in The Organism, and is somewhat dissonant with Goldstein’s thesis that abstract thought 
(“the categorical attitude”), in contrast to behaviour guided only by concrete circumstances, 
is what is responsible for flexibility and freedom in human actions.  
 
 
                                                        
23 E.g. Peterson (2016: 4-6). Yet, the ontological import of the élan vital is not so obvious and Bergson 
(1907/1944, 48) is careful not to align his philosophy with Hans Driesch and his metaphysics of entelechies. See 
essays in Burwick and Douglass (1992) for more discussion of this question.  
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3. “Merely Abstractions”: Goldstein’s Criticism of the Reflex Theory 
Roboticists and cyberneticists, the AI developers of recent memory, were not the first to 
frame the brain within a conceptual scheme inspired by engineering. Before the 
computational theory of the brain it was common to think of the structures of the nervous 
system as a reflex machine, an aggregate of discrete sensor and effector arcs, devised by 
natural selection to orchestrate the adaptive if puppet-like behaviour of humans and other 
animals. In one seminal presentation of the reflex theory by Thomas Henry Huxley (1875), 
the workings of the nervous system are compared with a steam engine and a clock, and the 
first serious proposals to engineer devices to replicate cognitive functions of the nervous 
system came from the reflex tradition (Hull and Baernstein 1929). By the 1930’s the reflex 
theory in neurophysiology had become a poster child for the mechanistic approach to living 
systems (Fearing 1930).24 I should mention in passing that William James (1879, 1890) and 
John Dewey (1896) were two early critics of the reflex theory, as applied to brain science 
and psychology. Dewey argued that the cleanly differentiated concepts of stimulus and 
response, sensory input and motor output are abstractions from what is in reality a 
continuous circle of activity.  
 
Goldstein makes it clear that his theory of the organism is “diametrically opposed to the 
usual one, which would regard the lower organisms as reflex machines and which would 
even reduce the processes in a higher organism to the same mechanical basis” 
(1934/1939, 171). In this section I will examine in detail Goldstein’s criticism of the reflex 
theory, highlighting the commonalities with the critique of abstraction, discussed above. In 
the sections that follow, we will see that the arguments against the reflex machine, that turn 
on a consideration of the limits of knowledge to be gained through scientific abstraction, 
can be transposed with little effort to make a case against computationalism -- as can be 
                                                        
24 However, Canguilhem (1955/2015) argues that the concept of the reflex arc did not originate within the 
mechanistic physiology of Descartes, nor was it developed primarily by mechanists, but belongs to an 
alternative “vitalist” tradition, from Thomas Willis to Johannes Müller. 
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seen in the writings of Canguilhem and Merleau-Ponty. It is useful to begin here with 
Goldstein’s response to Charles Scott Sherrington (1857-1952). 
 
On first reading, it is hard to see what the quarrel is between Goldstein and the physiologist 
whose experimental research was the crowning achievement of the reflex tradition in 
neurophysiology. Both scientists emphasise that the phenomena of integration and co-
ordinated activity are key to understanding the nervous system. Neither believes that the 
simple reflex – a stereotyped motor response that inevitably follows a specific kind of 
sensory stimulus, regardless of context – actually occurs in living animals. In a sentence 
that could have been penned by Goldstein, Sherrington writes near the start of the 
Integrative Action of the Nervous System that,  
 A simple reflex is probably a purely abstract conception, because all parts of the 
nervous system are connected together and no part of it is probably ever capable of 
reaction without affecting and being affected by various other parts, and it is a 
system certainly never absolutely at rest. (Sherrington 1906, 7-8) 
Most of the text in Chapter 2 of The Organism is devoted to showing that empirical 
observations conflict with the supposition that complex motor responses are combinations 
of simple reflexes.25 But Sherrington himself does not commit himself to this 
unsophisticated supposition;  Goldstein in fact grants that Sherrington appreciates “very 
well that he is dealing with an abstraction” (Goldstein 1934/1939, 89). So why does 
Goldstein maintain his opposition to this self-aware version of the reflex theory, one that 
does not fall into a fallacy of misplaced concreteness by mistaking the ideal of the simplex 
reflex for the responses that are actually observable?26  
  
                                                        
25 Goldstein (1934/1939, 79) summarises: “Practically nowhere can a simple stimulus response relationship, 
corresponding to the strict reflex concept, be directly observed.” 
26 See Merleau-Ponty (1942/1967, 32-33) for a very interesting discussion of Sherrington’s appeal to 
abstraction. 
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The answer to this question can be found if we consider the sentence of Sherrington’s that 
follows the one quoted above: 
But the simple reflex is a convenient, if not a probable, fiction. Reflexes are of various 
degrees of complexity, and it is helpful in analyzing complex reflexes to separate 
from them reflex components which we may consider apart and therefore treat as 
though they were simple reflexes. (Sherrington 1906, 8) 
It is on these points – on the utility of positing these abstractions for the acquisition of 
knowledge of the system – that the disagreement occurs. For one thing, Sherrington’s 
approach will only work if the reactions that are said to approximate to simple reflexes are 
really less variable in their manifestations than more complex sequences of behaviours, and 
Goldstein says that this is not the case (1934/1939, 80). But the deeper point is that 
Goldstein rejects the utility of deploying experimental interventions to create preparations 
that approximate to the scientist’s ideal of simplicity (such as artificially isolating one part of 
the system by sectioning the spinal cord), and attempting to work up from the analysis of 
these isolated, simplified systems to a theory of the whole, integral system. What this 
methodology assumes is the “summative concept of the whole”, the assumption that the 
behaviour of the whole is equal to the aggregate of the behaviour of its parts examined 
independently which, according to Goldstein is not adequate to explain how the parts of the 
organism work together outside of experimental conditions (Goldstein 1934/1939, 90). 
Alluding to Sherrington, whose most used experimental preparations were the “spinal dog” 
(Sherrington 1909) and “decerebrated cat”, Goldstein observes that physiologists do not 
notice the inadequacy of summative concept of the whole if they “never deal...with the 
organism as a whole”  (p.90) – if they only make observations of animals whose bodies are 
mutilated, never studying humans (like Goldstein) or intact animals.  
 
A theme of organicist philosophy, one prominent in the writing of Whitehead, is the criticism 
of the scientific methodology that seeks to ground knowledge in substance, i.e. that which 
is constant, unchanging, and isolatable, and is taken to underlie the complex, shifting world 
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of appearances.27 This is the conceptual role played by the original notion of the atom. One 
way to describe Goldstein’s rejection of the reflex physiology is as a mistaken search for the 
atoms of behaviour, and Goldstein does frequently refer to their experimental methods as 
“atomistic”. Having dropped the atomistic assumption, there is no logic to following 
experimental procedures that isolate parts in order to observe them independently from 
their context in the organism, for it is to be expected that parts behave differently in wholes. 
It appears thoroughly wrongheaded to presume that the behaviour observed in simplified 
experimental contexts will explain what happens with the whole organism, in its natural 
context. Goldstein writes that,  
Investigations under artificial conditions can never lead to knowledge of natural 
performances. Thus it is impossible to regard the reflexes as unnatural processes, 
and to assume at the same time that one can obtain from them an insight into the 
‘natural’ performances of the organism.  
The fact that the reflex is a process in the organism does not mean that it belongs 
to the real nature of the organism. Reality, in this sense, means that a process 
belongs to the true ‘nature’ of the organism. In this light, ‘unnatural’ and ‘unreal’ are 
the same. (1934/1939, 405) 
Here we can read Goldstein as warning us away from a fallacy of misplaced concreteness, 
in which the “unnatural” and abstract in the sense of being derived from a process of 
experimental simplification, or “unreal” and ideal – the ‘as if’ concept of a simple reflex --  
are allowed to take the place in our thought of the whole, concrete organism.28  
                                                        
27 Thus organicism is often depicted as a Heraclitean philosophy. It is therefore to be noted that in an 
“Excursus” excluded from the English translation of The Organism, Parmenides is instead identified as the 
original proponent of the conception of knowledge advocated by Goldstein (1934/2014, 311-315). 
28 Interestingly, Goldstein’s view is that the unreality of abstraction is more tolerable in the physical sciences 
than in biology.  
“If the reference to the whole is insufficient, the action may possibly be correct for a part, artificially 
isolated. But it will distort the functioning of the whole. Therefore we [biologists] cannot be satisfied 
with symbols which correspond only to part processes. And therefore we have to reject, for example, 
the scheme which serves as the basis of reflexology. Our knowledge must come closer to the ‘real’ 
than is requisite for a science of inorganic nature.” (1934/1939, 412-3) 
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Goldstein’s rejection of the physical-chemical approach to biology becomes apparent in his 
discussion of the significance of the chemistry of hormones for the biologist. In an argument 
that is comparable to the passage of Bergson (1907/1944:36 quoted above 2.3), Goldstein 
declares: 
But do all these amazing facts indicate anything more than that the substance, which 
has been determined in an isolating investigation, is significant for the existence of, and 
the formation of, a very definite property of the organism? They tell us nothing about 
the property itself, nor about the life process as a whole. A chemical description will 
never adequately explain a biological process. (1934/1939, 208; emphasis added) 
The rejection of a physical-chemical conception of the organism depends on the argument 
that isolating experiments performed on parts of organisms are by their nature abstracting, 
giving “partial views”, as Bergson put it. By assembling a collection of such partial views it 
is impossible to recover the “essence” (Bergson) or “nature” (Goldstein) of the organism. 
Goldstein differs from Bergson, however, in his belief that the scientific intellect is not 
confined to the analytical, abstractive frame of mind.  
 
Goldstein’s recommendation is that “synthesis”, a kind of “Schau” (intuition) is a necessary 
complement to the analytical mindset that yields “atomizing” experimental science: 
Biological knowledge is continued creative activity, by which the idea of the 
organism comes increasingly within reach of our experience. It is a sort of ideation 
equivalent to Goethe’s “Schau,” a procedure which springs continuously from 
empirical facts and never fails to be grounded in and substantiated by them. 
(1934/1939, 402)   
In addition, Goldstein (e.g. p. 400, 403) emphasizes, that analysis should not ever be 
dispensed with in spite of his warnings about its limitations. Successful research requires a 
                                                        
Not only must biologists avoid mistaking the abstract for the concrete, avoiding the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness, but they also must eschew abstraction more than physicists do.  
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balanced co-operation of analysis and synthesis. 29 In explaining why it is that this creative, 
synthetic dimension in biological thought is not a retreat into mysticism, it is quite significant 
that Goldstein puts himself, the knowing subject and scientist, back into the frame of 
examination -- for it is the unprincipled ignoring of the scientist’s own subjectivity and 
mindset that Husserl condemns in “objectivizing” science. Goldstein writes that,  
The attainment of biological knowledge we are seeking is essentially akin to this 
phenomenon--to the capacity of the organism to become adequate to its 
environmental conditions. This is a fundamental biological process by virtue of 
which the actualization of organisms is made possible. Whenever we speak of the 
nature, of the idea, picture, or conception of the organism, we have in mind these 
essentials for the realization of adequacy between the organism and its 
environment. And these are the principles of composition of that picture which 
biology has to grasp. In so doing, the cognitive process of the biologist is subject to 
practically the same difficulties of procedure as the organism in learning; he has to 
find the adequacy between concept and reality. (1934/1939, 402-3) 
The biologist’s quest to attain knowledge is fundamentally no different from any living 
creature’s attempt to come to terms with the world around it. This act may have an element 
of creativity, but does not require anything supernatural. Goldstein’s criticism of 
mechanistic biology, and any attempt to understand the nervous system by analogy to 
mechanistic processes and machines, is that it fails to make that leap of imagination that 
would synthesise isolated empirical observations into a picture of the organism that attains 
a higher level of knowledge or insight. We will now read Canguilhem (Section 4) and 




                                                        
29 “Scientific research is always founded upon analysis, and, on the other hand, will never proceed without a 
certain synthesis.” (p.404) 
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4. “What we can learn from the machines is how our brain must differ from them”30 
The writings of Canguilhem are attracting increasing attention in their own right, not merely 
as a prelude to the oeuvre of Michel Foucault. Roth (2013) relates in detail the path from 
Canguilhem’s early hostility to Bergsonian philosophy, to an expressed appreciation and 
debt to Bergson after the late 1930’s. Canguilhem’s sympathies with vitalism were self-
declared, but by “vitalism” he did not mean an ontological commitment to vital forces but a 
kind of “positivism” that takes the phenomenon of life at face value (Canguilhem 
1965/2008a). His admiration for The Organism is evident in the introduction to the 1952 
collection of essays and lectures Knowledge of Life (La connaissance de la vie).31 Following 
a quotation from Goldstein, Canguilhem writes that if in doing mathematics, we feel like 
angels, to do biology we have to feel a little like beasts. One is reminded of Goldstein’s 
contention that biological knowing is an instance of the attainment of adequacy between 
the (human) organism and the environment. In my reconstruction of an anti-
computationalist position in Canguilhem, I will read two texts, “Machine et Organisme” (first 
presented in 1947), and “The Role of Analogies and Models in Biological Discovery” from 
1963.  
 
It was noted in Section 2.1 that Whitehead acknowledged a debt to Bergson’s idea that 
there is a foundational abstraction that defines modern science (i.e. classical physics 17-
19th century): the spatialisation of time. In one of his accounts of this distorting abstraction, 
Bergson describes it as being arrived at by a superficial analogy.  
No question has been more neglected by philosophers than that of time; and yet 
they all agree in declaring it of capital importance. This is because they begin 
ranking space with time; then having thoroughly studied the one (generally, space), 
they leave it to us to treat the other similarly. But we shall not arrive at anything that 
way. The analogy between time and space is, in fact, wholly external and superficial. 
                                                        
30 Neurophysiologist Lord Adrian, Quoted approvingly by Canguilhem (1963, 516). 
31 See also Canguilhem (1955/2015, 4 & 164), where he writes approvingly of Merleau-Ponty’s uptake of 
Goldstein in La structure du comportement. 
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It is the result of our using space to measure and symbolize time. If we are guided 
by this analogy, therefore, if we are to go looking in time for features like those of 
space it is at space that we shall stop, at space that covers time and represents it 
visually for our convenience – we shall not have pushed on to time itself. (Bergson 
1922/1999, xxviii) 
Here we have the template for abstraction via analogy, the framing of the investigation of 
one order of nature by means of its similarity to a system whose order of relations are better 
known or more readily comprehended by the scientist. It is an abstraction because the 
details of the two systems that differ from one another (the disanalogies) are put to one side 
and, as I argue elsewhere, it has practical utility as a simplifying strategy (Chirimuuta 
forthcoming-b). The danger of falling into a fallacy of misplaced concreteness comes 
precisely with the habit of neglecting these disanalogies for so long that one forgets that 
they ever existed. One strand of Canguilhem’s writing on the comparison between 
machines and organisms in the history of science can be taken as a warning against this 
neglect of difference. Where the more readily comprehended system (“analogue source”32) 
is the man-made machine, and the more epistemically opaque system (“analogue target”) 
is an organism or organ of a body, and where a machine can be made to function almost 
like that organ, it is easy to forget that there was ever anything more to the organ than the 
functioning replicated in the machine. When dealing with machines and organisms, not 
space and time, the analogy is “internal and deep” rather than “external and superficial”, 
heightening the risk of conceptual substitution. Computationalism is precisely the result of 
this mistaken substitution: cognition – the functioning of the cerebral organ – is taken to 
be fully captured by machines which bear some analogy to this organ, viz. computers or 
artificial intelligences.  
 
We will now examine some of the details in Canguilhem’s writing that lend themselves to 
this anti-computationalist argument. Ian Hacking is one prominent philosopher of science 
who has published on “Machine and Organism”. However, his reading is rather fixated on 
                                                        
32 This terminology is borrowed from Bartha (2016). 
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the statement that “Machines can be considered organs of the human species.” 
(Canguilhem 1965/2008b, 87),33 and Hacking takes the anti-Cartesian lesson of the essay 
to be simply that there is another kind of dualism (organ vs. machine) that needs to be 
uprooted – thus projecting onto Canguilhem the ideas of Donna Haraway and Andy Clark, 
on how we are all cyborgs. This misses the way in which Canguilhem’s anti-Cartesianism 
relates to the anti-mechanistic spirit of the organicist philosophy that Canguilhem draws 
on. Thus Hacking ignores the places in the text in which Canguilhem emphasises the 
distinguishing characteristics of organisms – their plasticity, unpredictability, and often lack 
of segregated functional systems.34 For example, the epigraph to Part I of Connaissance de 
la vie, is a quotation from L’Évolution Créatrice, which advises against the presumption that 
nature works in the way that we would rationally expect things to be done, and hence, by 
analogy with how we would build a device to work – that is, the expectation based on the 
use of “pure reason” which is, for Bergson, a capacity always directed at instrumental 
results. Thus it is helpful to examine various portions of “Machine and Organism” through 
the Bergsonian lens left unutilized in Hacking’s reading. 
 
A large portion of the essay is a reflection on Descartes’ invitation, at the start of Traité	de 
l’homme (Treatise on Man), for us to consider the human body as a statue made by divine 
hands – greatly more complex and intricate than the moving, hydraulic devices of 
Descartes’ time, but still obeying the same mechanical principles. There is a nested set of 
                                                        
33 Incidentally, Canguilhem credits Bergson for this insight (1965/2008b, note 64); cf. “ce qui fait, selon nous, la 
valeur de la philosophie bergsonienne, pourvu toutefois qu’on la lise sans préjugé — ce qui, nous pouvons 
l’avouer, n’a pas toujours été notre cas — c’est d’avoir compris le rapport exact de l’organisme et du 
mécanisme, d’avoir été une philosophie biologique du machinisme, traitant les machines comme des organes 
de la vie, et jetant les bases d’une organologie générale” Canguilhem (1947, 332), quoted in Roth (2013, 628) 
34 E.g. p.90 “An organism thus has greater latitude of action than a machine. It has less purpose and more 
potentialities. The living organism acts in accordance with empiricism [selon l’empirisme], whereas the 
machine, which is the product of calculation, verifies the norms of calculation, that is, the rational norms of 
identity, consistency, and predictability. Life, by contrast, is experience, that is to say, improvisation, the 
utilization of occurrences; it is an attempt in all directions.” (Canguilhem 2008b:90) 
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analogical relationships that Canguilhem locates in the Traité:	a statue is an artefact built 
by humans to have a resemblance to the human body, while the human body is to be 
understood as if a statue made by God. Crucially, we are told in Canguilhem’s exposition 
the Cartesian machine-organism analogy that any crude, human-made machine is best 
understood as a finite approximation of a God-made device of infinitely many parts. As 
Canguilhem writes, 
The Idea of the living, which divine art imitates, is the living thing. And just as a regular 
polygon is inscribed within a circle, and in order to derive the circle from it, it is necessary 
to pass through infinity, so the mechanical artifice is inscribed within life, and to derive 
one from the other, it is necessary to pass through infinity – that is to say, God.  
(2008b:85) 
The metaphor of the chasm between infinity and a finite approximation is used frequently 
in L’Évolution Créatrice to convey the gap between the reality of the living organism and 
the abstract representations that come of it through the techniques of mechanistic science. 
For example, Bergson (1907/1944) writes that “life is no more made of physics-chemical 
elements than a curve is composed of straight lines” (p.35), and that the eye is an “infinitely 
complex machine” (p.98). 
 
Another Bergsonian theme of “Machine and Organism” is that of the mutual dependency 
of mechanistic and finalistic approaches to the living world (a pair of approaches that 
Bergson associates with Leibniz), and their anthropomorphic character. As Bergson 
(1907/1944, 50) would have it, “[t]he error of radical finalism, as also that of radical 
mechanism, is to extend too far the application of certain concepts that are natural to our 
intellect.” This is in the background of a central claim of Canguilhem’s, that Descartes’ 
mechanistic philosophy never gets us “one step” outside finality because “to explain organs 
or organisms through mechanical models is to explain the organ using the organ. It is a 
tautology, basically, because…. machines can be considered organs of the human species” 
(Canguilhem 2008b, 87). The point concerning the tautological nature of mechanistic 
explanation can be expressed as follows: if machines are essentially prosthetic extensions 
of human intentionality, in particular, of the purposeful action that is manifest primarily in 
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the organs over which we have the most voluntary control – our hands and limbs (see p.94), 
then machines and mechanisms are themselves full of human intentionality and purpose. 
It is therefore a (self) deception to attempt to use the analogy between machines and 
organisms to provide explanations of living organs that purport to have banished all notions 
of intentionality, purpose and finality. For finalism always accompanies mechanistic 
explanation, like a lurking Doppelgänger. 
 
This passage may not appear at first glance to contain an argument from abstraction, but it 
does bear interesting relations to Whitehead’s critique of the dualism that results from the 
Cartesian abstraction that takes mathematized matter, res extensa, (what is subject to 
mechanistic explanation) to be fully distinct from what is mental and volitional, res cogitans.  
For both Canguilhem and Whitehead, Descartes’ procedure is to abstract the body machine 
from the concrete living person, which is to leave a residue that does not have a place in 
mechanistic explanation, but which persists awkwardly: Whitehead focuses on the mental 
life (sensations and qualities) divorced from the Cartesian conception of matter, whereas 
Canguilhem draws attention to the finality that is concealed and deferred through 
Descartes’ picturesque idea of a divinely-made machine.  Like Husserl’s figure of Galileo, 
Descartes for Canguilhem is an archetypal “discoverer/concealer” [Entdecker/Verdecker] 
of 17th century natural philosophy. One can also compare Canguilhem’s discussion with 
Husserl’s treatment of the Lifeworld as the substrate of meaning on which the scientific 
edifice is built. One aspect of the meaningfulness or intentionality belonging to the Lifeworld 
is the purposefulness of organisms as we ordinarily encounter them. This immanent 
purposefulness is not compatible with the Cartesian conception of matter. But in the 
Cartesian substitution of the organism for a mere mechanism, Canguilhem tells us, finality 
cannot really be abolished, and so it is made transcendent, residing with Descartes’ divine 
artificer. This residual finality was supposed to have been rendered superfluous by 
mechanistic explanation, and yet it lingers at the periphery of scientific consciousness.  
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In “Machine and Organism” there is a brief remark on cybernetics, to the effect that these 
self-regulating machines do not close the gap between machines and organisms – there is 
still a qualitative difference: 
There are doubtless devices that regulate themselves, but these are machines 
superposed upon machines by man. The construction of servomechanisms or 
electronic automatons displaces the relationship of man to machine but does not 
alter its sense. (Canguilhem 1965/2008b, 88) 
Canguilhem dwells longer on cybernetics in the 1963 “Analogies” paper. One of the guiding 
ideas of this work is the observation that in physics the analogical use of mathematical 
models does not invite one to project the ontology of the analogue-source (e.g. a pendulum 
described mathematically as a harmonic oscillator) on to the analogue-target (e.g. an 
electronic oscillator circuit) (Canguilhem 1963, 514-515).  In physics it is obvious to the 
modeller that the use of the harmonic equations in both contexts says nothing about the 
inherent nature of the two systems related by the analogy -- a caution that is often lacking 
when such modelling practice is conducted in biology. Canguilhem’s point is that the use 
of a physical system as the source for an analogy to a biological target carries with it a 
promise of a reduction of the organic to the inorganic – i.e. the making sense of the organic 
in perspicacious physical terms. This is why the ontological projection of an analogical 
model onto a living system is tempting. Canguilhem goes on to say that cybernetic models 
are a good example of this tendency, especially when the model’s actions (e.g. in a robot), 
tends to simulate or mimic a natural behaviour. 
But has it not sometimes happened that the analogical models of the biologist have 
benefited from an unconscious validation having as its effect the reduction of the 
organic to its analogy mechanical, physical or chemical? Despite their great degree of 
mathematical complexity, it does not appear that cybernetic models are always safe 
from this accident. The magical aspect of simulation is strongly resistant to the exorcism 
of science. (Canguilhem 1963:514-5) 
 
Canguilhem refers to the well-known cybernetic research of Norbert Wiener and W. Grey 
Walter. One of the ideas promoted by the cyberneticists was that biological regulation, 
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which appears intuitively as purposeful control, can be modelled and duplicated with 
feedback mechanisms, leading to the claim that teleology and purpose in living systems 
simply are feedback (Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow 1943). Canguilhem rejects this 
ontological re-characterisation of regulation in organic systems, saying that we should not 
take feedback models to be representing the “process of nervous regulation”. Accordingly, 
one should be aware that what the model represents is only the structure or set of 
characteristics common to organic and mechanical regulations (which is “a new class of 
objects”), and that this abstracts away from the differences between the two kinds of 
system: 
when one labels as feed-back the parts of the nervous system for which the 
mechanical mode of regulation serves as a model, one seems to give the impression 
that organic feed-back is part of the same class of objects as mechanical feed-back. 
In fact, one has created, by bringing these together, a new class of objects whose 
definition would be able to retain only the operational characters common to 
regulator organs and mechanical regulating arrangements. (Canguilhem 1963:515) 
For this reason, Canguilhem endorses the warnings made by scientists themselves about 
the limitations of cybernetic models of the nervous system – “the counsels of prudence that 
biologists address to each other inside their working community.” (p.516) – such as the 
remark of Adrian (1954, 8, quoted above) and the observations of mathematician John von 
Neumann on the robustness and plasticity of organisms that is found lacking in 
computational machines.  
 
The conclusion of the “Analogies” paper is somewhat scathing. Canguilhem says that in 
the early history of science the “tendency to identify organisms and machines” was “naïve”, 
“magical or puerile.” But the latest attempts to build life-like models and machines is no 
more enlightened, Canguilhem suspects:  
“perhaps a more radical naïveté, an attitude of cognizance, scientific or not, in the 
face of life, fundamentally inspires new attempts made to exhibit in a model such-
or-such organic causalities.”	(Canguilhem 1963:519)	
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To confuse the capacities of a cybernetic construction with the nervous system would be 
no better founded than the mistaking of Vaucanson’s duck for one in the pond. But the 
greater sophistication of cybernetic and computational models, compared to mechanical 
automata, makes this mistake all the more likely.  
 
5. Merleau-Ponty on the “Absolute Artificialism” of Cybernetics 
That Merleau-Ponty was greatly influenced both by Goldstein and Husserl is well 
documented and uncontroversial. Moran (2012:278-281) notes in particular that Merleau-
Ponty began reading Husserl’s Crisis manuscripts in 1939, and that the impact is strongly 
felt in Merleau-Ponty’s most well-known book, Phénoménologie de la perception 
(Phenomenology of Perception), first published in 1945. La Structure du Comportement 
(The Structure of Behaviour), Merleau-Ponty’s first book, contains a detailed critique of 
reflexology, especially as it appears in the work of Sherrington and Pavlov, that is much 
indebted to Goldstein. In it there are numerous references to The Organism, and to 
Goldstein’s joint publications with Adhémar Gelb. Merleau-Ponty is less frequently linked 
to Bergson and Whitehead than Husserl and Goldstein. However, in the Collège de France 
course notes on Nature, one finds appreciative exegeses of Bergson (Matière et mémoire, 
as well as L'Évolution créatrice) and Whitehead (the 1933 lecture, Nature and Life).35 
 
In my reconstruction of Merleau-Ponty’s abstraction argument against computationalism, I 
place the Phenomenology of Perception at one side and attend more to The Structure of 
Behaviour and the late essay “L'Œil et l'Esprit” (“Eye and Mind”), because the former 
contains the most detailed critique of reflex physiology with its notion that animal behaviour 
is no more than the operation of a reflex machine, and the latter contains direct criticisms 
of cybernetics. That is not to say that the content of the Phenomenology conflicts with those 
other works. Indeed, the treatment of the body in Part 1 of that book begins with an attack, 
recapitulating points from the Structure, on the account offered by reflex physiology, both 
                                                        
35 Incidentally, the lectures on nature are referred to by Canguilhem (1989/2012, 50) in an essay on health.  
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of behaviour and our “being in the world”.36 Indeed, the project of the Phenomenology, to 
recover for philosophy the world that lies open to us in perception, presupposes that we 
cannot take the world depicted in the abstract and idealised models of science as an 
absolute, fundamental reality, of greater significance for philosophy than the world of 
perception – which is of course a message of the critique of abstraction presented in 
Section 2.37 Thus we find discussion in the introduction to the Phenomenology, of the failure 
of attempts to establish “an objective science of subjectivity” (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, 
11), because of reliance on the artificial posit of the discrete sensation.  Moreover, overt 
statements of the critique of abstraction do occur in the Phenomenology, such as, “[n]ature 
is not in itself geometrical, it only appears so to a careful observer who limits himself to the 
macroscopic givens” (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, 57) -- that there is something misleading 
about the geometrization of nature performed in classical physics is of course a recurring 
motif in the philosophy of Bergson, Whitehead and Husserl. 
 
A striking thesis of the Structure of Behaviour is that behaviour resists a settled placement 
in either one of the two orders of being that our Cartesian scientific heritage presents us 
with – neither in the external/physical world of matter, nor in the internal/mental realm of 
intention does behaviour sit well:  
Behavior, inasmuch as it has a structure, is not situated in either of these two orders. 
It does not unfold in objective time and space like a series of physical events; each 
moment does not occupy one and only one point of time; …… The world, inasmuch 
as it harbors living beings, ceases to be a material plenum consisting of juxtaposed 
                                                        
36 “Thus, our ‘world’ has a particular consistency, relatively independent of stimuli, that forbids treating ‘being 
in the world’ as a sum of reflexes” (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, 82).  
See also, “[Physiology] too begins by situating its object in the world and by treating is [sic] as a fragment 
of extension. They lose sight of behavior by focusing on the reflex….” (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, 7). 
 
37 It also seems that Merleau-Ponty follows Goldstein in attributing the conception, or perception, of 
something primarily a whole, as being merely an aggregate of abstracted parts, to our employing the 
“analytical attitude” (1945/2012, 16). See Section 3 on Goldstein’s notion of analysis and synthesis in biological 
thought.  
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parts; it opens up at the place where behavior appears. (Merleau-Ponty 1942/1967, 
125)  
This passage can usefully be read with a glance back to the early 20th century critiques of 
abstraction. Most striking is Merleau-Ponty’s denial that the moments of behaviour occupy 
discrete moments in time, and that the material world of living beings is a collection of 
nestled parts. For Bergson, duration is contrasted with the spatialised time of classical 
physics precisely in its not being thought of as a series of separate moments, like beads on 
a string.  In Whitehead, the distortion introduced by classical physics regarding space – the 
abstraction of simple spatial location – leads to a conception of the matter contained in it, 
as comprising innumerable juxtaposed parts that each have a unique location and are not 
at any fundamental level interconnected with one another. We can interpret Merleau-Ponty 
also as making a similar point, that the abstractions regarding space and time that founded 
mathematical physics, and granted it its predictive power, lead us astray when we attempt 
to account for the bodies and behaviour of organisms.38  
 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty goes on to say that behaviour resists our habitual mode of 
conceptualising – which would try to fit it into mechanistic terms – even though the 
phenomenon of behaviour is available to perception: 
The animal, to an extent which varies according to the integration of its behavior, is 
certainly another existence; this existence is perceived by everybody…. Spinoza 
would not have spent so much time considering a drowning fly if this behaviour had 
not offered to the eye something other than a fragment of extension; the theory of 
animal machines is a ‘resistance’ to the phenomenon of behaviour. Therefore this 
phenomenon must still be conceptualized. (Merleau-Ponty 1942/1967, 126-7) 
To take the mechanistic view of animals is to attempt to locate behaviour within the spatial-
temporal abstractions of physical science. According to Merleau-Ponty, the conception of 
                                                        
38 Compare with the argument in Part 1 of the Phenomenology that the body is not an object, where object is 
defined as what “exists partes extra partes and thus only admits of external and mechanical relations among 
its parts or between itself and other objects” (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, 75). 
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animals as machines is just not true to the phenomenon of behaviour, which does not 
present itself as “a fragment of extension”. But if one ignores the phenomena, and settles 
for the abstract conception of animals as being fleshy machines, one will inevitably believe 
in the possibility that their organs and capacities are replicable in artificial systems, with a 
computer being equivalent to a brain. Alternatively, the rejection of the conception of 
animals as machines entails the rejection of the possibility of manufacturing devices whose 
operation is perfectly equivalent to their organs, such as intelligent robots. Thus we see that 
the rejection of computationalism follows directly from Merleau-Ponty’s pursuance of the 
critique of abstraction. In fact, Merleau-Ponty does not just reject computationalism as any 
other fallacy, but warns that a culture that convinces itself of the truth of computationalism 
– in its early guise, the “ideology of cybernetics” – is one walking into a “nightmare”. We 
find this arresting claim in the opening section of “Eye and Mind”.  
  
In comparison to his 1948 Radio France lectures (Merleau-Ponty 2004), where there is a 
detectable optimism about the potential of 20th century science (e.g. quantum and 
relativistic physics) to move beyond the problematic assumptions of classical physics, the 
assessment of contemporary research to be found in “Eye and Mind” is quite foreboding.  
Merleau-Ponty  shares with Canguilhem (1963) -- and for that matter, with the information 
theorist Claude Shannon (1956) -- a dim view of practice in biology that grabs haphazardly 
after any mathematical model that has had one successful application, to see if perchance 
it will work elsewhere (Merleau-Ponty 1961/2004, 292). This leads, Merleau-Ponty says, to 
a science of “intellectual fads and fashions” and “[v]agabond endeavours.” 
 
The criticism of cybernetics is grounded in a Husserlian concern that science must not 
forget its starting point in our Lifeworld (the “brute, existent world”), and must not mistake 
for an absolute and general reality, the operationalised conceptions of its objects, those 
laboratory constructs that are the result of careful experimental isolation:   
For all its fluency, science must nevertheless understand itself; it must see itself as 
a construction based on a brute, existent world and not claim for its blind operations 
that constituting value which ‘concepts of nature’ were able to have in an idealist 
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philosophy. To say that the world is, by nominal definition, the object x of our 
operations is to treat the scientist’s knowledge as if it were absolute, as if everything 
that is and has been was meant only to enter the laboratory. Thinking ‘operationally’ 
has become a sort of absolute artificialism, such as we see in the ideology of 
cybernetics, where human creations are derived from a natural information process, 
itself conceived on the model of human machines. If this kind of thinking were to 
extend its reign to man and history; if, pretending to ignore what we know of them 
through our own situations, it were to set out to construct man and history on the 
basis of a few abstract indices (as a decadent psychoanalysis and a decadent 
culturalism have done in the United States) – then, since man really becomes the 
manipulandum he takes himself to be, we enter into a cultural regimen where there 
is neither truth nor falsity concerning man and history, into a sleep or a nightmare, 
from which there is no awakening. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/2004, 292) 
The “absolute artificialism” of cybernetics is a kind of vicious circularity: the cyberneticist 
has an understanding of organisms based on selective attention to analogies with machines 
and then uses this conception of organism to inspire the building of new devices, which are 
then projected back onto living organisms as models of their workings, and through the 
cumulative and recurrent effect of this process it becomes impossible to think of the 
organism – including the human being – in any other terms than as a tool, a thing to be 
manipulated and an instrument at the service of interminable projects of intervention and 
control.  
 
These portents at the beginning of “Eye and Mind” are a precursor to the redemptive 
message to be found in the bulk of the essay, which is that the contemplation of painting is 
one path back to awareness of the “brute, existent world”. This is, in other words, a return to 
the lived experience of the body. We find in the paragraph following the one quoted above, 
the recommendation that in order to offset the danger presented by the cybernetic view of 
humanity, scientific thought must not continue to ignore the subjectivity of the body and its 
environing world:  
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Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from above, and thinks of the object-
in-general, must return to the ‘there is’ which underlies it; to the site, the soil of the 
sensible and opened world such as it is in our life and for our body – not that possible 
body which we may legitimately think of as an information machine but that actual 
body I call mine….  (Merleau-Ponty 1961/2004, 292-3) 
Thus we see how closely the embodiment/embeddedness argument against 
computationalism follows from the abstraction argument. Computationalism (or at the time 
of Merleau-Ponty’s writing “Cyberneticism”) is an erroneous view of organic behaviour and 
experience because it remains in the grip of a set of abstractions inherited from classical 
science since the 17th century -- mechanism and the mathematization of space and time -- 
which make it impossible for it to properly grasp the phenomenon of sentient behaviour. To 
return to the body and the Lifeworld is to break the grip of these abstractions and open the 
door to a different kind of science.   
 
Is 4E cognitive science – the research that is embodied, enactive, embedded and 
ecological – the different kind of science that Merleau-Ponty envisaged? This is not the 
place to give a full and proper answer to this question. Not least because 4E cognitive 
science is a broad church and some of its practitioners may be more sensitive to the 
concerns expressed by Merleau-Ponty. What I will say is that the element of 4E cognitive 
science that relies on mathematical modelling, especially dynamical systems theory, to 
represent the embeddedness (“close coupling”) of the mind and its environment, is equally 
open to the criticisms of abstraction levelled at cybernetics and classical (symbolic) 
computationalism. As a scientific approach it is just as much abstract,39 “objectifying” 
(neglecting the subjectivity both of the scientist and the target of modelling), and 
physicalistic (since it borrows its mathematical framework from physics) as the research 
criticised by Canguilhem and Merleau-Ponty. Furthermore, the dynamical systems 
approach to cognition has at its heart an analogy between organismic cognition and a very 
                                                        
39 I argue at length elsewhere that the abstractions grounding the dynamical approach in cognitive science are 
different from and complementary to the abstractions of classical computationalism (Chirimuuta 2020).  
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simple, mechanistic regulatory device – the Watt governor (van Gelder 1995). All of the 
concerns about the over-extension of such machine-organism comparisons would apply 
there.  
 
Thus it strikes me that Merleau-Ponty’s pronouncements about embodiment and the 
embeddedness of thought could not have been so easily assimilated to the 4E tradition had 
attention been paid to the argument from abstraction that is, I submit, the line of argument 
that has a philosophical primacy over the turn to embodiment. Yet the version of Merleau-
Ponty who tends to be quoted as an inspirational figure for the 4E movement is like the 
stereotype of a French lover, fixated on the body and sensuality, lyrical and seductive, with 
his many notions of the pleasures of embodied existence; that Merleau-Ponty was well 
versed in the experimental psychology and neurobiology of his time also enhances his 
credentials amongst 4E philosophers of cognitive science. We do not encounter the 
philosopher ruminating on the dehumanising trend of technological civilisation, and ranking 
the philosophical significance of art above that of laboratory science. Perhaps this is 
because the deeper criticisms of Merleau-Ponty, and the philosophers who influenced him, 
on the role of abstraction in the scientific world view are much harder to reconcile with the 
technological ambitions of cognitive science in the professional context of today’s research 
university.  
 
6. Conclusions and Directions 
It is worth recapitulating the main points of this paper. I argued in Section 2 that philosophy 
in the first half of the 20th century saw an extensive discussion of the role of abstraction and 
idealisation of science that did not find its way into the canon of philosophy of science 
taught to students decades later in the anglophone world. In this discussion we encounter 
a critique of abstraction that warns philosophers against the reified and over-literal 
interpretation of scientific concepts and models that are highly simplified and at least 
somewhat distorted. The critique of abstractions employed within mechanistic strands of 
biology, such as reflex physiology, played a prominent role in the organicist tradition of 
biology, exemplified here by the work of Kurt Goldstein. I then argued that Goldstein’s 
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criticisms of the abstractions employed in reflex physiology, and the rejection of the 
attendant notion that the animal is a reflex machine, are continuous with the criticisms of 
cybernetics put forward by Canguilhem and Merleau-Ponty. The common claim is that 
thinking of an animal as a machine, the brain as a computer, is to impose onto the organism 
a mechanistic schema derived from physics that must deny the existence of features of the 
living system not shared with the merely physical one, such as the basic interdependency 
of the parts of the organism, and the explanatory role of the state of the organism as a whole. 
Furthermore, those research programmes in behavioural physiology, whether they be 
reflexology or cybernetics, that create the appearance of the descriptive and explanatory 
adequacy of the machine-organism analogy do so by experimental strictures that limit 
organismic behaviour to over-simplified and inadequate operationalisations: the abstract 
model achieves its success when the target of the model – the living system – is itself put 
in a simplifying frame. This is the “absolute artificialism” of cybernetics. 
 
It should be clear that this abstraction argument generalises to other kinds of computational 
models of brain processes. Computational models abstract from most of the complexity of 
the biological brain – its material basis in neural tissue, its situation in a body, its interaction 
with other organismic processes such as those of the endocrine and immune systems. 
Computationalism in the philosophy of mind contends that cognition in animals is fully 
reproducible in a non-living computational machine, sharing only “functional equivalence” 
with the “wetware” running in the brain. The abstraction argument against 
computationalism has it that the computationalist is too incautious in her reading of lessons 
about the nature of the minds of humans and other animals from any computational model 
of their brains and behaviour, because the model’s judicious neglect of biological complexity 
is likely to make it miss the hard-to-duplicate features of organic cognition that we care 
most about – sentience, flexibility, common-sense, a sense of being in the world. Just 
because the abstraction to computational description of neural systems is useful for 
building specialist AI programs that duplicate certain cognitive tasks, it should not be 
assumed that computation is the essence of cognition, or that building AI expert systems 
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is a step along the road to the explanation of general intelligence – the kind of intelligence 
possessed by humans and other animals.  
 
In this paper I have argued that the philosophy of science behind the embedded/embodied 
cognition stance favoured in the 4E tradition has been unduly neglected. It also deserves 
mention that there is a political background to the argument against the identification of 
organisms with machines, at least as it appears in the discussion of Canguilhem. As 
Canguilhem relates, drawing on the book Machinisme et Philosophie  by Pierre-Maxime 
Schuhl, slaves were animate machines for Aristotle – the original machines, he asserts, 
were humans marked out for exploitation.40 For Canguilhem, there is no way to separate 
the concept of mechanism from that of exploitable labour and resource: 
Descartes does to the animal what Aristotle did to the slave: he devalorizes it in order 
to justify its use by man as an instrument.  
Furthermore, 
The theoretical mechanization of life and the technical utilization of the animal are 
inseparable. Man can make himself master and possessor of nature only if he denies 
all natural purpose and can consider all of nature, including, apparently, animate 
nature – except for himself – to be a means. 
 This is what legitimates the construction of a mechanical model of the living 
body, including the human body… (1965/2008b, 84) 
 
Given that historians of science have already begun to trace the relationship between the 
invention of computers and industrialisation (Schaffer 1994), cybernetics and cold-war 
politics (Galison 1994), there remains an important task, which is to find out whether the 
arguments put forward by Merleau-Ponty against computationalism and for embodied and 
                                                        
40 E.g. p.18-19 “Ces considérations permettent de préciser quelle portée il faut attribuer au passage célèbre du 
début de la Politique où Aristote declare que l’esclavage cesserait d’être nécessaire si les navettes et les 
plectres pouvaient se mettre en movement d’eux-mêmes: l’idée s’accorde à merveille avec sa definition de 
l’esclave, instrument animé. Est-ce là, chez le Stagirite, une divination, une prévision de l’industrie modern?” 
(Schuhl 1938, 18-19) 
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embedded cognition, rest also on a political philosophy. If so, it would turn out that the 4E 
programme has a forgotten politics, just as I have shown it to depend on a neglected 
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